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767. After this rule, the conduct of the in-
surer need no longer be opprobrious or un-
conscionable in nature, but only intentional 
with an underlying improper purpose of 
inducing a client to settle directly with the 
insurer. 
The court reversed the court of special 
appeals but admitted that it did so only be-
cause Sharrow barely alleged a claim for 
tortious interference with contract. Shar-
row, on the basis of the broader rule, al-
though lacking specificity, alleged the ele-
ments necessary to sustain: the tort claim. 
Based on the facts and the court's analysis, 
it is highly unlikely that Sharrow had what 
was needed to prove the commission of 
tortious interference with contract. The 
court, however, supplied practitioners, 
who may find themselves victims of an in-
terference with contract, with the ammu-
nition necessary to actually prove the tort. 
The court emphasized that the deter-
minative factor in such cases is whether 
there was purposeful conduct by the in-
surer, or whether such conduct was by the 
client. If the facts of Sharrow's case showed 
that State Farm rather than Zorbach actu-
ally initiated the settlement negotiations, 
the purposeful conduct of State Farm would 
indeed be more substantial and the tort 
claim more likely to succeed at trial. Also 
absent from Sharrow's complaint was an 
allegation that State Farm's purpose in ne-
gotiating directly with Zorbach was for its 
own benefit. The presence of such an alle-
gation would enhance the success of a claim 
alleging the commission of the tort and 
certainly assist in proving the same. 
The Sharrow case sends a message to in-
surance companies to tread lightly when-
ever they may be in a position of dealing 
with a claimant directly. The insurer's 
duty toward its insured, heretofore rather 
ambiguous, does not extend to intentional 
conduct, however subtle, whereby the in-
surer leads a claimant to discharge his at-
torney and settle his claim. 
-Kevin S. Anderson 
Knill v. Knill: HUSBAND MAY NOT 
BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED 
TO DENY CHILD SUPPORT 
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel 
may not be applied to estop a husband 
from denying support to an illegitimate 
child born to his wife by another man dur-
ing the marriage, unless the husband's 
voluntary conduct in treating the child as 
his own gives rise to reliance by the child 
upon such conduct and such conduct re-
sults in the child suffering financial loss. 
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Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546 
(1986). 
Charles and Cledythe Knill had been 
married ten years. As a result of their mar-
riage, two children were born. After the 
birth of their children, Charles underwent 
surgery for a full vasectomy. However, one 
and a half years after the operation, Mrs. 
Knill bore a third child, Stephen. Both 
parties acknowledged that Stephen was 
not Charles' son. According to Cledythe, 
the natural father was a former co-worker. 
Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for 
her infidelity and the marriage continued 
for twelve years with Stephen being reared 
and supported as a member of the Knill 
family. During this twelve year period, 
Stephen had no knowledge of his illegiti-
macy. Charles was named as Stephen's fa-
ther on his birth certificate. Additionally, 
Stephen was treated as "one of the family" 
and was thereby so known in the commu-
nity where the family resided. In the after-
math of a family dispute, Cledythe revealed 
to Stephen that Charles was not his nat-
ural father. Charles nevertheless con-
tinued to support Stephen for two years 
until Cledythe sued for divorce. Among 
her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested 
child ·support for Stephen. The Circuit 
Court for Frederick County held,that even 
though Charles was not Stephen's natural 
father, he was estopped from asserting the 
illegitimacy of the child in order to avoid 
child support. 
On appeal, Charles argued that since he 
was not Stephen's natural father he could 
not be ordered to support Stephen. Mary-
land law places the responsibility of child 
support squarely on the shoulders of nat-
ural parents. MD. FAM. LAW CODE 
ANN. § 15-703(b)(l) (1984). See also, 
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 794 Md. 183,448 A.2d 
353 (1982). Charles asserted that he stood 
in loco parentis during the twelve years that 
he voluntarily supported him. Since this 
relationship had been temporary in nature, 
he owed no legal duty to continue to sup-
port Stephen. On the other hand, Cledythe 
contended that the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel should be applied to prevent an 
inequitable and unconscionable result. 
For the first time in Maryland, the court 
of appeals had the opportunity to address 
the applicability of equitable estoppel to a 
child support proceeding. For the doc-
trine's to apply that a party claiming the 
benefit of estoppel must have been misled 
to his injury and changed his position for 
the worse, having believed and relied on 
the representations of the party sought to 
be estopped. Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 
Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976). See also, 
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804 
(5th Ed. 1941). 
In Knill, by a 4-3 decision, the court held 
that a husband cannot be equitably estopped 
to deny a duty to support. In reaching its 
decision Judge Cole for .the majority re-
viewed decisions from other jurisdictions 
which had previously addressed the issue. 
While a few jurisdictions had held that 
equitable estoppel is to be applied in order 
to force child support, as in Clevenger v. 
Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 707 (1961) and the Supreme Court 
of New Jersey in Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 
154,478 A.2d 351 (1984), the majority for 
the court followed the holdings of the ma-
jority of jurisdictions which do not apply 
the doctrine to estop a husband from deny-
ing paternity and a support obligation. See 
e.g., Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 
114, 479 A.2d 833 (1980); Weise v. Weise, 
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985). 
The court in Knill stated that in order 
for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to ap-
ply, the related elements of representation, 
reliance and detriment must be present. 
The Court indicated that the application 
of the three-element test requires that the 
voluntary conduct or representation of the 
party to be estopped must give rise to 
the estopped party's reliance and, in turn, 
result in detriment to the estopped party. 
In applying the elements of equitable es-
toppel to the facts in Knill, the court found 
the elements of representation and reli-
ance to be present. The facts showed that 
Charles represented to Stephen that he 
was his father and these representations 
were accepted and acted upon by the child. 
[d. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The facts also 
showed Stephen relied upon the represen-
tations and treated Charles as his father, 
giving his love and affection to him in ig-
norance of the true facts. [d. In regard to 
the element of detriment, the court stated, 
[T]he evidence in this case~ however 
fails to demonstrate any finimcial detri-
ment incurred by Stephen as a result 
of Charles's course of conduct during 
their twelve year relationship ... if any 
detriment was incurred by Stephen, it 
was emotional and attributable to his 
mother ... it was she who ripped the 
'cloak of legitimacy' off the boy when 
she revealed to him that Charles was 
not his father. 
Knill, at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The court 
concluded that since the elements of equi-
table estoppel were not satisfied, Charles 
could not be held legally responsible for 
child support. 
For the dissent, Chief Judge Murphy, 
opined, "I think the majority is dead 
wrong." Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552. Murphy 
agreed that the natural father should be 
considered the primary source for child 
support and recognized that caution must 
be exercised when imposing child support 
liability on a non-biological father. In ad-
dition the dissent, like the majority, be-
lieved that an estoppel may arise even 
when there is no intent to mislead, if the 
actions of one party cause a prejudicial 
change in the welfare of another. How-
ever, the dissent disagreed with the ma-
jority's reasoning that financial detriment 
is the only type of detriment, such being 
the sole reason the majority denied the ap-
plication of equitable estoppel. Id. at 541, 
510 A.2d at 556. 
The dissent concluded that emotional 
detriment should be sufficient to establish 
the element of detriment, and the facts in 
Knill supported a finding of emotional 
detriment. /d. at 547, 510 A.2d at 559. In 
light of the circumstances in Knill, the dis-
sent observed the duration of the husband's 
representations to determine whether a true 
paternal relationship developed between 
Charles and Stephen. Moreover, the frus-
tration of the realistic opportunity to dis-
cover and establish a relationship with the 
natural father was considered. Finally, the 
dissent noted the devastating effect on a 
child's welfare where a long established 
paternal relationship has been breached 
resulting in the child being proclaimed a 
bastard and left without a father. The dis-
sent ultimately determined that detriment 
was in fact established, and therefore 
Charles should have been precluded from 
disavowing parental responsibility for 
child support. Id. at 554, 510 A.2d at 560. 
In Knill, the court stated that since stat-
ute of limitations no longer exist in pa-
ternity suits Cledythe could maintain a suc-
cessful paternity action against Stephen's 
natural father. Furthermore, even though 
Charles knew Stephen was not his son, the 
conduct which he demonstrated was con-
sistent with Maryland's public policy of 
strengthening the family unit. Maryland 
encourages such conduct so long as it does 
not interfere or deprive the child or mother 
of the right or opportunity to seek legal 
support from the natural father. 
In Maryland, as in the majority of other 
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, 
a husband may not be equitably estopped 
from denying child support to an illegiti-
mate child. In Knill, a case of first impres-
sion, the dissent would have considered 
whether the paternal relationship did, in 
fact, exist. The end result in Knill is that 
Charles Knill, who voluntarily assumed 
the role as a father, has no legal duty to 
support Stephen. But in the final analysis 
Stephen will suffer the "ultimate humilia-
tion of having no support from a man who 
for all purposes was his father for fourteen 
years." Brieffor Appellee at 6. 
- William James Momson, III 
United States, Petitioner fJ. American 
Bar Endowment et al.: SUPREME 
COURT FINDS CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATION'S INSURANCE 
PROGRAM TAXABLE 
The Supreme Court recently upheld a 
tax assessment by the IRS against the 
American Bar Endowment (ABE) concern-
ing income received from an insurance 
plan made available to its members. In 
United States, Petitioner v. American Bar 
Endowment et al., 106 S.Ct. 2426 (1986), 
the Court decided two issues related to the 
particular plan. First, whether income de-
rived from the insurance plan constituted 
"unrelated business income" subject to tax 
under § § 511 through 513 of the Internal 
Revenue Code (Code), 26 U.S.C. §§511-
513, and second, whether the members 
who participated in the plan could claim a 
charitable deduction for those premium 
payments which amounted to dividends 
on behalf of the ABE. 
The ABE is a corporation exempt from 
taxation because it is "organized and oper-
ated exclusively for charitable ... or edu-
cational purposes." 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3). 
In order to fund its charitable work, the 
ABE provides group insurance policies to 
its members. By purchasing insurance as a 
group, the ABE has bargaining power that 
an individual would lack. Furthermore, 
the cost of the insurance to the group is less 
because it is based on the group's claims 
experiences instead of general actuarial 
tables. Normally, the cost of this plan to 
the insurance company is less than the 
premiums paid by the ABE, thereby en-
titling the ABE to a "dividend." Instead of 
dispersing the amount of the dividend 
among the participating members, the 
ABE retains the whole dividend amount to 
aid its fund-raising efforts. Members are 
required to agree to this arrangement as a 
condition to participation in the insurance 
plan. They have also been advised by the 
ABE that relinquishment of the dividend 
constitutes a tax-deductible contribution 
to the ABE, thereby making the after-tax 
cost of the insurance, "less than the cost of 
a commercial policy with identical coverage 
and premium rates." 106 S.Ct. at 2429. 
The ABE was assessed a tax deficiency 
after an audit by the IRS in 1980. Its insur-
ance plan was considered an "unrelated 
trade or business" such that any profits 
realized were subject to tax. 26 U.S.C. 
§§51l-513. The ABE paid the taxes as-
sessed, and then brought an action in the 
Claims Court for a refund after all admin-
istrative remedies had been exhausted. In-
dividual participants who had not yet 
taken a deduction for the excess premiums 
paid brought an action for refunds as well. 
The two suits were consolidated for trial in 
the Claims Court. 
The Claims Court found in favor of the 
ABE in its suit, holding that its insurance 
plan did not constitute a "trade or busi-
ness" for purposes of the tax. The court's 
conclusion was based on the following four 
factors: 
(1) The program was developed as a 
means of raising funds for the 
ABE's educational efforts. 
(2) The program's success in generat-
ing dividends evidenced noncom-
merical behavior. 
(3) Together, participants could change 
the program to reduce premiums. 
(4) The ABE was not in competition 
with other non-charitable com-
panies because it did not under-
write or act as a broker. 
In the individual respondent's action, the 
court held that they had failed to show that 
the insurance was purchased at a greater 
price ''with the intention that the excess be 
used to benefit a charitable enterprise," 
and were thus denied a charitable deduc-
tion. 4 Cl.Ct. 415 (1984). On appeal, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the decision of the Claims Court 
as to the ABE, but reversed and remanded 
the decision as to the individual respon-
dents for further fact-finding. The Su-
preme Court granted the Government's 
petition for certiorari on both issues. 
I. In a six to one decision, the Court held 
that the insurance program offered by the 
ABE constituted a trade or business for 
purposes of the unrelated trade or business 
tax. By definition, the Code sets up a three-
part test for determining whether a trade 
or business carried on by a tax-exempt or-
ganization should be taxed. In its discus-
sion, the Court found that the ABE's in-
surance program is regularly carried on, 
that it is not substantially related to the 
purpose of the ABE's tax-exempt status, 
and that its activity is both "the sale of 
goods" and "the performance of services." 
Thus the three-part test is satisfied. Fur-
thermore, the program possesses the char-
acteristics of services provided by other 
entities for a profit. After this initial con-
clusion, the Court went on to strike down 
three of the four factors relied on by the 
Claims Court in its holding. 
As to the program's success in generating 
dividends, the Court found this to be a 
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